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The Kiangnan Division quartered in Hupei" was stated by General Li to be quite reliable. The division consists of three infantry regiments only, one of which consists mostly of Kuang-hsi men, another was raised in Chiang-su during the revolution from Shantung men who formed part of the old Chiang su provincial troops, and the remaining one contains men from Anhui and other Northern provinces, with some Yüunanese. The Division is under General Li Tien Tsai, a Yünnanese who formerly held a military command in Kuang-hsi. During the revolution he was put in command of these mixed forces, who received the name of "Kianguan Division quartered in Hupei."
With regard to the question of Hunan, General Li stated that trouble might be expected from this quarter, but that the Northern troops would without any doubt be able to deal with any Hunanese troops which might enter Hupei. He had a poor opinion of the Hunanese troops after his experience of their conduct in evacuating Hanyang during the revolution.
I have not, so far, been able to visit Hunan, and, therefore, cannot offer an opinion at first hand as to the value of the Hunanese troops. They have, however, always been reported on hy previous military attachés as good troops, and have had a good reputation generally as fighters. A large percentage of the military forces of the provinces south of the Yang-tsze are recruited from Hunan, and those individual Hunanese soldiers whom I have seen at various times certainly appeared to be good fighting material. During the revolution the Hunanese supplied large numbers of recruits for the revolutionary forces, and there is at any rate one good formed body in Hunan available, the 31st Regiment of the VIIIth Division of Nanking. This division, which is reported to have rebelled, is the best of all the units of the former revolutionary forces on the Yang-tsze. It is, therefore, a question how far General Li's optimism as to the certainty of crushing, with the troops at present near Wuchang, an attack by Hunanese on Hupei is justified. The blowing up of the Changsha magazine will undoubtedly hamper the Hunanese. General Li referred to this incident, and though he did not say so, it is quite likely it was prearranged. Should, however, the troops near Wuchang be insufficient, the situation elsewhere may admit of further Northern reinforcements being sent to repel the Huanese, either from the north, or from Chiang-hei when the Chiang-hsi troops have been defeated.
General Li had every confidence in the ability of the Northerners to defeat the Chiang-hsi troops. He stated that the IInd and VIth Divisions were now concentrating near Kiukiang for an attack on the Hukow forts, and that there was not the least doubt that this would be successful. The VIth Division (probably about 10,000 strong) are now nearly all concentrated near Kiukiang, and the Und Division is now being sent daily in lighters and launches to Kiukiang, so that an attack may shortly be expected. General Li stated that the Northern troops had been successful in the fighting that had hitherto taken place, but only three battalions were, he stated, engaged.
The plan which General Li hopes to carry out is to capture first of all the Hukow forts and then when these, and Kiukiang, have been put in a state of defence against recapture, the Northern troops after leaving a garrison in Chiang-hsi will proceed to Nanking to co-operate with Chang Hsün. The latter, General Li stated, had obtained a victory near Hsü-chou Fu and was advancing on Nanking.
General Li was extremely optimistic as to the early and complete success of the Northern troops against any forces the Southerners could bring against them. He belittled the effect the rebellions of distant provinces such as Szechuan might have, stating that their intervention would be too late to be of any use.
No mention was made of the navy, but unless the navy remains loyal, and until the Yang-taze forts are secured by Yuan Shih-kai, it is of course obvious that the employment of the IInd and VIth Divisions to deal with Nanking, and afterwards if necessary, with Hunan would not be practicable. With the navy loyal, and the Yang-taze forts secured, the possession of interior lines gives the Northerners an immense advantage in dealing with such widely separated forces as those of the various Yang-taze provinces.
D. S. ROBERTSON, Military Attaché, Peking.
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